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1. The Supreme Court answered this very question in the case of Nix v. Hedden,  149
U.S. 304 (1893). It decided that even though a tomato was a “fruit of a vine,” it was more
like a vegetable because it is usually served as part of an entrée, like carrots and potatoes,
not as a dessert, like apples or blueberries. Id. at 307.
Chapter 6
Analogical Reasoning
Your friend Bob sends out an invitation to a potluck feast. In her emailed
RSVP, Sylvia writes, “So excited for this! I’ll bring along a fruit dish for dessert.”
She arrives with a tomato and goat cheese torte. Unhappiness ensues.
Bob is peeved because he believes Sylvia broke her promise to bring a fruit
dish. He envisioned an apple pie or peaches with ice cream. Sylvia disagrees;
she knows that tomatoes are agriculturally classified as fruits. Regardless, she
thinks, Bob has no right to be upset because the dessert is delicious.
The friends turn to you at the end of the dinner party. Who is right? Is a
tomato a fruit or a vegetable?
The process you used to reach an answer may have gone something like this:
Well, a tomato has seeds like apples and peaches. Sylvia is right; it’s technically
a fruit.
Or like this: A tomato is usually served with a main course, like carrots or
potatoes, not as a dessert. It has a savory taste, not a sweet one. Of course Bob
should be mad; a tomat o’s a vegetable.1
If you followed either of these lines of thought, you reasoned by analogy. It is
a form of reasoning that is commonplace; we use it every day to make decisions.
And it is the aspect of legal reasoning that makes it a unique and distinctive form.
In this chapter, we break down why, exactly, this muddy and controversial
form of reasoning has become such a bedrock of legal analysis and provide
suggestions for how to construct effective analogies in your own legal writing.
* * *
Excerpt from Legal Writing in Context
by Susan McMahon (Georgetown University Law Center) and 
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2. See, e.g.,  H.L.A. Hart,  The Concept Of Law 155 (1961).
3. Many theorists have questioned the fairness of this principle, arguing, among other
things, that injustice perpetuates itself through the demand that like cases be treated alike.
Stare decisis guarantees that an unjust result in one case will be replicated again and again.
See, e.g.,  Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings,  145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57, 80–86 (1996). While that
is certainly a valid argument against the principle, cases are rarely completely “alike,” and a
thoughtful lawyer can avoid unjust results by arguing that the precedent case is
distinguishable from the current case. This chapter gives guidance on how to craft those
kinds of arguments.
4. See, e.g.,  Lloyd L. Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use Of Analogy In Legal Ar-
gument 4 (2d ed. 2016).
5. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic For Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking
93–94 (3d ed. 1997).
Treat like cases alike.2 This command of the American legal system enables
stability and allows easy cases to be disposed of quickly, often without resort
to the adjudicative process. When the result in a present case is moored to the
outcomes of past cases, the law remains more predictable, coherent, and, some
would argue, fair.3
Analogical reasoning is the primary method by which practitioners tie
present facts to legal precedent. This kind of formal reasoning is unique to the
law— some have called it the hallmark of what makes legal reasoning distinct
from other forms of reasoning4— but it is also characteristic of much of our
informal thought processes. If I like the taste of a filet mignon, then I might
safely assume that I will also like the taste of a New York strip. I conclude, based
on the fact that both steaks come from the same animal, that they have a similar
taste.
This kind of reasoning has a simple structure:
(1) A has characteristic Y;
(2) B has characteristic Y;
(3) A also has characteristic Z;
(4) Because both A and B have Y, B probably also shares characteristic Z.5
For our steak example, the analogy would be:
(1) Filet mignon comes from a cow;
(2) New York strip also comes from a cow;
(3) Filet mignon tastes good;
(4) Because both filet mignon and New York strip come from a cow, New
York strip will also taste good.
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6. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept Of Law 155 (1961).
7. See, e.g.,  Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: The Classic Lectures on the
Law and Law School 68–71 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 Cornell
L. Rev. 761, 765 (2006); Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings,  145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57, 79–80
(1996).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 741 (1993) (“Rea-
soning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning. . . . [I]t is a characteristic part
of brief-writing and opinion-writing as well.”).
It is easy to say how this logic leads to results that are consistent with prece-
dent. It is also easy to see how quickly this form of reasoning can go awry. In
our steak example, for instance, a faulty analogy could be:
(1) Filet mignon comes from a cow;
(2) New York strip comes from a cow;
(3) Filet mignon is pink on the inside when cooked;
(4) Because both filet mignon and New York strip come from a cow, New
York strip will also be pink on the inside when cooked.
In fact, another circumstance altogether— your instruction to the chef to cook
the filet mignon rare— accounts for its pink coloring. Because the analogy above
tagged an irrelevant fact, the analogy does not accurately predict the result.
So too in legal analogies. As H.L.A. Hart said, “[U]ntil it is established what
resemblances and differences are relevant, ‘Treat like cases alike’ must remain
an empty form. To fill it, we must know when, for the purposes in hand, cases
are to be regarded as alike and what differences are relevant.”6 Because of these
weaknesses in the analogical form, because its predictive power is not as strong
as deductive or even inductive reasoning, some scholars have questioned its
value in legal reasoning, arguing that analogies are simply fig leaves for judges
to import their policy preferences into the law.7 While these objections certainly
have merit, they do not change the reality on the ground: An effective lawyer
must be able to dexterously deploy analogies to win cases.8 This chapter helps
you do just that.
A. The Judgment of Importance
Let’s return to the problem of Sylvia’s tomato and goat cheese torte. Both
analogies are sound on their faces. Here is Bob’s analogy:
(1) Carrots and peas are savory;
(2) Tomatoes are savory;
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9. Steven J. Burton, An Introduction To Law And Legal Reasoning 57 (3d ed.
2007).
(3) Carrots and peas are vegetables;
(4) Therefore, tomatoes are vegetables.
And Sylvia’s:
(1) Blueberries and strawberries have seeds;
(2) Tomatoes have seeds;
(3) Blueberries and strawberries are fruits;
(4) Therefore, tomatoes are fruits.
To decide which analogy is more compelling, you must decide whether flavor
or seed structure is a more relevant consideration for the dispute.  In this
context, a dinner party where a guest promised to bring a dessert, flavor likely
trumps seeds. Bob’s anger is justified.
But in a different context,  an agricultural study,  say,  a tomat o’s
reproductive system would be of primary importance.  Seeds would then
trump flavor.
The broader context thus controls whether you consider a tomato more like
a carrot or like a blueberry. In legal reasoning, too, the purpose of the com-
parison, the context in which it appears, determines which of two analogies is
more compelling. Steven Burton called this the judgment of importance.9 Each
case has some similarities and differences from every other case. An attorney’s
job is to decide (or argue) that relevant similarities outweigh relevant
differences, or vice versa.
And just like the dinner-party context controlled the judgment of
importance in our tomato fiasco above, so too does the legal context control
the judgment in your legal writing. This legal context is made up of several
considerations: (1) the procedural posture, (2) the relevant legal rule, and (3)
the policy underlying the legal rule. We discuss each contextual frame below.
1. Procedural Posture
The procedural posture of your case is a crucial contextual consideration
because it sets the outer boundaries of relevant facts. As discussed in Chapter
2, certain facts are off-limits at different stages of a litigation. For example, if
you are writing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), then you
are limited to the facts as asserted in the complaint. You need to accept these
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10. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,  to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’ ” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
facts as true; your motion will be wildly unsuccessful if you argue the facts in
the complaint are false.10
An analogy based on facts that are off-limits will fall apart. Thus, it is crucial
that you know not only the procedural posture of your own case, but also the
procedural posture of the precedent cases. An opinion deciding a post-trial issue
in a civil litigation, after the factfinder has resolved factual disputes, is of limited
help to a practitioner looking to determine whether her case will survive a motion
to dismiss. The circle of available facts is much wider in a post-trial case than it
is at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and any analogy between the two is open to at-
tack. The strongest analogies are formed between cases with the same procedural
posture; if those cases are unavailable, move on to cases where the procedural
standard applied to facts is most similar. The further you travel from the same
procedural standard, the more susceptible your analogies are to critique.
2. Legal Rule
While procedural posture is part of the judgment of importance, the appli-
cable legal rule is the North Star of your analogy.  Just as the dinner-party
context determines whether a tomato is a vegetable or a fruit, so does the legal
rule determine whether the facts of your case are similar to or different from
the precedent.
Say you were asked to determine whether a court would rule for your client,
a farmer, when he failed to deliver a promised bushel of tomatoes to a buyer
following a drought. The buyer sued for breach of contract, but the contract
contained a provision excusing the parties from their obligations if an “act of
God, such as a flood or other natural disaster” intervened. In one previous
case, a court ruled for the defendant when the contract contained the same
language and the defendant, a farmer, did not deliver a bushel of apples after
a hurricane destroyed his apple trees.
One possible legal rule here: An act of God excuses performance. The prece-
dent tells you that a hurricane qualifies as an act of God. The case also notes
that the defendant was a farmer, just like your client is a farmer. But nowhere
does the legal rule applied in the case mention, or even imply, the defendant’s
occupation. This common fact is therefore irrelevant. Your focus should be on
what qualifies as an act of God, and your analogy should be between droughts
and hurricanes.
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How do you craft such an analogy? Look to the reasoning that led to the re-
sult in the precedent case. On the one hand, both hurricanes and droughts are
natural disasters that cause significant harm to crops. On the other, a hurricane
is a sudden event, while a drought takes place over a long period of time. If
the precedent case focused on the extent of the harm caused by natural
disasters,  then a severe hurricane and a massive drought are analogous. If,
however, the judge focused on the sudden nature of the hurricane, then a hur-
ricane and a drought are distinct.
Yet, sometimes, the legal rules and the pertinent precedents do not fully an-
swer the question. Suppose your client had a tank full of reserve water and re-
fused to use it, allowing his tomato crop to wither and die. The precedent case
focused only on the massive harm caused by a hurricane and made no mention
of whether an individual must take action to protect his crop. Blindly applying
the legal rule and the precedent case would lead to an outcome where
individuals would be excused from performance when they had the means and
ability to fulfill their obligations. When the legal rule and precedents have left
a blind spot, then lawyers may turn to the policy underlying the legal rule.
3. Policy
The policy advanced by a legal rule is a third consideration. One possible
policy goal in the act-of-God example from above would be to honor the lan-
guage of the contract as written. The dependability of contracts relies on en-
forcing the language agreed to by the parties. And since the language here made
no mention of a party’s duty to offset the harm caused by a natural disaster,
the fact that your client did nothing to protect his crops would be irrelevant.
But if the policy goal instead were to ensure that parties to a contract would
not be held responsible for their obligations under the contract when disasters
beyond their control occur, then the fact your client did not water his plants
becomes relevant to the outcome.
Where would a lawyer find the policy undergirding a particular rule? Statutes
often contain their purpose in the text itself; if it’s not contained there, then a
look through the cases interpreting the statute may provide an answer. For
common law rules, cases also provide the best resource for determining the
policy the rule is supposed to support. If those resources yield nothing, turn
to secondary sources, such as treatises, encyclopedias, or law review articles,
for clues as to what the legal rule was intended to accomplish.
Sometimes, there is one clearly stated policy rationale for a particular legal
rule; these cases are easy. Other times, there is more than one policy rationale,
and the potential rationales conflict. When faced with these harder cases, you
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must choose which principle best satisfies the goals of the legal rule and con-
struct an analogy based on that principle. The strategies for making this choice
differ depending on whether you are predicting an outcome or advocating for
an outcome. We’ll address those strategies in later chapters on objective and
persuasive writing.
B. Crafting Analogies and Distinctions
Once a practitioner has made the judgment of importance and has decided
whether the similarities or differences between sets of facts control, she must
then construct a case comparison to convince others that her analysis is correct.
To do this effectively, you must include the facts, reasoning, and holding of
the precedent, then compare those facts to the facts of the current case, before
concluding that the holding in your case should be the same as in the precedent
(or different from the precedent). Case comparisons can either take the form
of analogies or distinctions, and your construction of the comparison differs
depending on whether you are trying to convince the reader that these cases
are alike or different. The difference lies in the level of detail you use to describe
the facts of each case.
1. Analogies
With analogies, your goal is to show the reader the connection between the
precedent case and the current case. Sometimes, these two sets of facts are
identical. These are the easy cases that are often resolved before they ever see
the inside of a courtroom (or a lawyer’s office). The cases that require lawyerly
assistance are often far more difficult. In your writing, your goal is to make
concrete the sometimes-abstract connections between precedent and current
facts. To do so, you must: (1) identify the specific relevant facts, and (2) gen-
eralize out from those facts until the tie between the two cases is clear.
The judgment of importance will help with the first task. You decided which
facts were relevant when you decided on the similarities that outweighed the
differences. An effective analogy focuses the reader’s attention on those facts.
The tendency for many beginning law students is to include all the facts they
know in the analogy. But experienced attorneys know that technique overwhelms
the reader and leads to confusion. Irrelevant facts clog up an analogy; a stream-
lined analogy that focuses attention only on the relevant information is the goal.
Analogies are at their easiest when the two sets of facts closely track one
another. When one farmer milks his neighbor’s cow without permission, it’s
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11. Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in “Legal Analysis”: A Systematic Approach,  40 U.
Miami L. Rev. 409, 451–52 (1986).
easy to draw the connection between that case and the next farmer-milking-
cow case that comes along. But those easy cases are usually resolved well before
a complaint crosses a court clerk’s desk. Often, there is daylight between the
precedent case and the new one. A cow becomes an iPad. Neighbors become
strangers. A resource taken for convenience becomes one taken in an emer-
gency.
When facts change, when the line from Case A to Case B is no longer straight
and direct, then the analogy needs to contain both the specific facts from the
precedent and a tie that shows the exact point of overlap between the two cases.
To create this tie, a practitioner generalizes out from the specific details of the
precedent and the specific details from the current case until the two fact sets
overlap. For example, to make an analogy between a cow and an iPad, you
could describe both as “things,” but that describes a whole host of objects not
relevant to the dispute. You could narrow the generalization by describing them
as “possessions” of the farmer. Even more specifically, you could describe these
objects as “business possessions” of the farmer, or items that help the farmer
in his work. Finding the most specific way to connect the two ideas is key; to
be overinclusive is to open your analogy up to devastating hypotheticals from
your opponent. One scholar has called this finding the lowest common de-
nominator between the facts of the two cases.11
The below example demonstrates the weakness of analogies without clear ties.
This paragraph comes from a memo analyzing a potential false light claim against
an artist who had publicly displayed a photo of an unconscious man with a bottle
of whiskey at his kitchen table; his wife stares into the camera with a black eye.
The photo was taken over a decade ago but was misdated as the current year. In
the meantime, the man had recovered from his alcoholism and reunited with
his wife, whom he no longer abused. The writer argues that this partial falsity
is enough to satisfy the tort’s requirement that the information presented be false:
In Jonap, the falsity element was satisfied when an employer published
a letter under an employee’s name espousing both opinions the em-
ployee did hold and opinions he did not hold. Similarly, Fisher’s photo
showed Stall as currently an alcoholic and wife beater, when he had
only been an alcoholic and abuser in the past.
That analogy places two sets of specific facts next to one another and leaves it
to the reader to draw the connection between the two. The connection may
be obvious to you, the writer, but it needs to be made concrete for the reader.
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A more effective analogy finds the lowest common denominator between
two sets of facts and uses that denominator to tie together the cases. In this
example, the tie between these two cases is that, in both instances, part of the
document that allegedly placed the plaintiff in a false light was true and part
was false. The below analogy generalizes out from the specific facts to make
that tie between the two cases explicit:
While some of the letter attributed to the plaintiff in Jonap was true
to his beliefs, other portions falsely characterized his beliefs. Similarly,
Fisher’s photograph simultaneously presented some truth about Tom
Stall, while also falsely characterizing his activities.
Sandwiching this generalized tie between the specific facts of each case will
create an effective case comparison, e.g.,
A representation that is true in some respects, but untrue in others,
qualifies as “false” for the purposes of the false light tort. In Jonap, the
falsity element was satisfied when an employer published a letter under
an employee’s name espousing both opinions the employee did hold
and opinions he did not hold. Although some of the letter was true
to the plaintiffs’ beliefs, other portions falsely characterized his beliefs.
Similarly,  Fisher’s photograph simultaneously presents some truth
about Tom Stall, while also falsely characterizing his activities. Fisher’s
photo showed Stall as currently an alcoholic and wife beater, when he
had only been an alcoholic and abuser in the past.
A successful lowest common denominator will not only be specific enough
to avoid overinclusivity, but it will also connect back to the legal rule or the
policy underlying the rule. Many beginning law students draw a legal rule from
a case, then construct an analogy to that case that does not apply the legal rule.
For example, in our act-of-God contract case, a novice paragraph could look
something like this:
Nonperformance under a contract is excused when an Act of God oc-
curs. An Act of God is a natural disaster that the plaintiff could not
have foreseen and could have taken no action to prevent. Bell,  534
F.2d at 64. In Bell, the farmer was excused from performance because
a flood destroyed his entire spinach harvest. This complete destruction
was an act of God. Here, the farmer should also be excused from per-
formance because his entire tomato harvest was destroyed.
This is not an effective analogy because it misses the point. The legal rule
the writer is seeking to prove is not “complete destruction is an act of God.”
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12. 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
13. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(internal citation omitted), aff ’d in part,  vacated in part,  remanded,  785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015).
14. Smith,  442 U.S. 735, 744–45.
Instead, it is “an act of God is a natural disaster the plaintiff could not have
foreseen and could have taken no action to prevent.” The facts relevant to fore-
seeability and prevention, and the lowest common denominator related to
those facts, should have been the focus of the analogy. Compare that to the
Jonap analogy above, where the lowest common denominator tied back to the
“partial falsity” legal rule.
2. Distinctions
When crafting analogies, identifying the lowest common denominator pro-
vides a connection between the cases. Zooming out from the specific details
allows you to find the similarity necessary to convince a reader that they are,
in fact, analogous.
But when you instead want to distinguish a case, or show why the outcome
under the current set of facts should be different than the outcome under a
past case, you generally need to zoom in and show each case in crisp detail.
By identifying these specific differences, you show how the lines of the cases
do not touch.
An example of this zoom in/ zoom out style can be found when comparing
district court decisions in lawsuits against the NSA’s metadata collection pro-
gram. Judge William Pauley found that the program did not violate the Fourth
Amendment and rested his analysis on an analogy to Smith v. Maryland,12 a
Supreme Court case that held using a pen register, which collected and recorded
the telephone numbers dialed from the defendant’s home, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the caller did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in that information. The connection between the two cases— the
zoom out— was that an individual “has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information provided to third parties.”13 Because the telephone numbers in
Smith were provided to the phone company, and the information in ACLU was
provided to the phone company, callers had no expectation of privacy in that
information.14
But in a different case, on nearly identical facts, Judge Richard Leon found
that these two cases were distinct, and the NSA did violate the Fourth Amend-
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15. Klayman v. Obama,  957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 36.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 37.
ment through its bulk collection program.15 He did so by focusing on the
specific details of the cases, rather than the generalized “communication to
third parties” highlighted by Judge Pauley. He conceded that the types of in-
formation at issue— phone numbers dialed, dates, times, and length of call—
was limited, as was the information in Smith.16 But the ubiquity of phones
and, more specifically, mobile phones, “has dramatically altered the quantity
of information that is now available and, more importantly, what that infor-
mation can tell the Government about people’s lives.”17 He went on to catalogue
the various ways in which individuals’ relationships to their phones had
changed over the thirty-four years since Smith had been decided.18
Thus, by focusing on the specific facts of Smith (one landline telephone, a
targeted investigation) and the specifics of the current case (almost every cell-
phone and landline in the United States, a bulk collection) Judge Leon crafted
a distinction that showed why the rule of Smith should not apply to the NSA
program. As he stated, “[T]he Smith pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk
Telephony Metadata Program have so many significant distinctions between
them that I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment
waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.”19
